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I. INTRODUCTION
In many emerging democracies, journalists have quickly
become aware that the democratic system in which they live
forbids them from publishing articles that criticize governments.'
1. See generally INTER-AMERICAN PRESS ASSOCIATION, 1997 ANNUAL REPORT (1997)
[hereinafter IAPA REPORT]. Panama, a member of the Organization of American States
(OAS) subscribing to the American Convention, expelled Gustavo Gorriti, a journalist
from Peru, in 1997 for criticizing the Panamanian government in a written newspaper
article. Panama Expels Peruvian Journalist Who Criticized Government, DEUTSCHE
PRESSE-AGENTUR, Sept. 9, 1997 (LEXIS, Nsamer Library, Curnws File); Gustavo Gorriti,
Tough Journalism, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 27, 1997, at op-ed page. Refusing to leave the
country, Gorriti moved into the newspaper's office building which brought about a much
maligned forcible expulsion from the country. Id. Ostensibly, Gorriti was expelled
because he was holding a job that could be held by a Panamanian citizen. Panama Expels
Peruvian Journalist Who Criticized Government, DEUTSCHE PRESSE-AGENTUR, Sept. 9,
1997 (LEXIS, Nsamer Library, Curnws File). Gorriti believes, however, that he was
expelled because of his in-depth coverage of the collapse of Bank Banaico. Gustavo
Gorriti, Tough Journalism, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 27, 1997, at op-ed page. Important positions
at the bank were held by several high ranking government officials; thus, the attack on
the bank was perceived by these officials as an attack on the government. Id. This
seems to be a blatant disregard for the American Convention and underscores the
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In 1997 the editor-in-chief and two reporters of the Costa Rican
newspaper La Naci6n had reported that the government was
paying for a car, chauffeur, and police protection for the former
minister of public safety and justice, Juan Diego Castro, although
ostensibly no threats had been made against Castro.2 La Naci6n
also published an editorial condemning the apparent misuse of
public funds.3 Criminal and civil charges were brought against
the newspaper.4 Although absolved of criminal charges, La
Naci6n was found guilty of libel and ordered to pay $40,000 for
"moral damages."'
At the crux of this criminal and civil litigation is the nature
of the press' right to publish information. Numerous countries
adhere to the notion that the press should have the right to
publish information, but that the right exists in concert with
correlative duties.6 The media has the generally recognized right
to publish truthful information. In addition, it has the generally
recognized complementary duties to report accurately and refrain
from defamation! Many Latin American countries, as
signatories to the American Convention on Human Rights,
subscribe to this view.8
As of this writing, the Inter-American Court of Human
Rights (Inter-American Court) has yet to review a defamation
case. When the Inter-American Court does face such a case, it
will not have to interpret Inter-American defamation law in a
pervasive problem in several Latin American countries, specifically, Panama, Venezuela,
Columbia, Peru, and Argentina where the balance of power between the judiciary and
government is blurred. IAPA REPORT, supra.
2. Absuelven y Condenan al Periodico La Naci6n, LA NACION DIGITAL, Mar. 3, 1998
(visited Mar. 31, 1998) <http://www.nacion.co.cr>. Costa Rica is a member of the OAS.
Charter of the Organization of American States, Apr. 30, 1948, 119 U.N.T.S. 3, 96; see
also INTER-AMERICAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS, ANNUAL REPORT 7 (1995) [hereinafter
INTER-AMERICAN COURT ANNUAL REPORT].
3. Absuelven y Condenan al Periodico La Naci6n, supra note 2.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. See discussion infra Part IV.
7. See discussion infra Part IV.
8. For the full text of the Convention's position on freedom of the press, see text
accompanying note 9, infra. American Convention on Human Rights, July 18, 1978, art.
13, sec. 1, 1144 UN.T.S. 123 [hereinafter American Convention). The American
Convention brought into being the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, which has
jurisdiction to adjudicate disputes in which a member State has allegedly violated the
Convention. Id. It also gives advisory opinions on the interpretation of the Convention
and whether a domestic State law complies with the Convention. Id.; see also INTER-
AMERICAN COURT ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 2, at 7-10.
1998] 205
INTER-AMERICAN LAW REVIEW
vacuum. The European Court of Human Rights, the United
States Supreme Court, and international treaties offer
substantial guidelines that the Inter-American Court might
adopt and adapt to the particular needs of Latin America with its
several nascent democracies.
This Comment delineates and analyzes a four-step approach
to defamation cases before the Inter-American Court. First, the
Inter-American Court must, of course, determine whether the
domestic law in question comports facially with Article 13 of the
American Convention on Human Rights (American Convention).
Article 13 governs defamation, freedom of expression and the
press. It states: "Everyone has the right to freedom of thought
and expression. This right includes freedom to seek, receive, and
impart information and ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers,
either orally, or in writing, in print, in the form of art, or through
any other medium of one's choice."9 The American Convention
and domestic law share common elements, such as defining
defamation in terms of "public figures." Second, the Inter-
American Court must weigh whether domestic judicial
interpretation or its own judicial determination should construct
the defamation doctrine applicable to the case before it. Third,
the Inter-American Court must apply this doctrine to determine
who qualifies as a "public figure" according to the defamation
clause of the Human Rights Convention. Finally, the Inter-
American Court must make the factual determination of whether
the printed material was, indeed, defamatory.
Given the existing needs of Latin America, this Comment
suggests that the Inter-American Court adopt a four-step
approach to analyze defamation cases. This approach recognizes
the competence of Latin American countries to draft reasonable
defamation standards appropriate for their nascent democracies;
thus, it is characterized by deference to member nations,
allowing members to craft a doctrine suitable to their needs in all
but the most egregious cases. In addition, this approach permits
the press to print substantiated information about public figures
but prohibits the printing of information known to be false or
printing as truth mere opinion deceptively commingled with
facts.
9. American Convention, supra note 8, art. 13, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123. For a more
detailed discussion of Article 13 in an international context, see discussion infra Part IV.
[Vol. 30:1
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Part II of this Comment examines the European Court of
Human Right's approach to defamation as it might be applied to
the Inter-American situation. Part III analyzes U.S. case law as
it pertains to defamation of public figures by way of a first
amendment approach. Part IV considers international treaties
and their collective insight into freedom of expression. Working
from these analyses, Part V addresses the Inter-American
Court's probable course of action in dealing with defamation of
public figures. Part VI suggests a four-step approach that the
Inter-American Court should adopt when faced with a
defamation case. Finally, Part VII discusses how the four-step
approach that this paper advocates would operate in light of the
provisions of the Seventh Ibero-American Summit in 1997.
II. EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS
A. The European Court's Analysis of Cases
The European Court" has influenced the Inter-American
human rights system in a number of ways. For example, the
Inter-American Court considered European Court case law when
developing Article 13 of the American Convention. Both the
Inter-American Court and the Inter-American Commission on
Human Rights have used European Court analysis in their
opinions also.' This past experience suggests that European
analysis could make a considerable contribution to the Inter-
American Court's development of defamation doctrine.
The European Court's review of several significant cases has
raised issues that the Inter-American Court will undoubtedly
face. Most importantly, the European Court has had to
determine the degree to which it will defer to State legislatures
and courts and what standard it should set in deciding whether
domestic law comports with the European Convention on Human
Rights (European Convention). The European Court has
10. See discussion infra Part IV, providing a useful context within which to consider
the position of the European Court.
11. Advisory Opinion OC-5/85, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., para. 43-50 (ser. A) No.5 (1986)
[hereinafter Advisory Opinion].
12. Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Annual Report of the Inter-American
Commission on Human Rights 1994, O.A.S. Doc. OEA/Ser.IJV/ii.88 Doc. 9 rev. Feb. 17,
1995 (1995) at 204-5 [hereinafter Inter-American Commission Annual Report].
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distinguished between what it considers fact and what it
considers mere opinion. The European Court has also allowed
the context behind putative defamation to play a significant role
in determining whether defamation had occurred.
Article 10 of the European Convention governs defamation
law analysis in the European Court.'3 It states:
1. Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right
shall include freedom to hold opinions and to receive and
impart information and ideas without interference by public
authority and regardless of frontiers. This Article shall not
prevent States from requiring the licensing of broadcasting,
television or cinema enterprises.
2. The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it
duties and responsibilities, may be subject to such formalities,
conditions, restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by law
and are necessary in a democratic society, in the interests of
national security, territorial integrity or public safety, for the
prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or
morals, for the protection of the reputation of rights of others,
for preventing the disclosure of information received in
confidence, or for maintaining the authority and impartiality
of the judiciary. 14
When the European Court analyzes an Article 10 case, it
follows a rigid process. 5 The European Court's analysis begins
with four critical questions: (1) Has the State interfered with the
applicant's rights? (2) Was the interference "prescribed by law?"
(3) Does the limitation imposed conform with a purpose in Article
10? (4) Is the limitation "necessary" in a democratic society?"
13. MARK W. JANIS & RICHARD S. KAY, EUROPEAN HuMAN RIGHTS LAW 258-65
(1991).
14. COUNCIL OF EUROPE PRESS, EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS:
COLLECTED TEXTS 18-19 (1994).
15. LouKIs G. LOUCAIDES, ESSAYS ON THE DEVELOPING LAW OF HUMAN RIGHTS
183-95 (1995).
16. Id. See also JANIS & KAY, supra note 13, at 233-300; HOWARD CHARLES
YOUROW, THE MARGIN OF APPRECIATION DOCTRINE IN THE DYNAMICS OF EUROPEAN
HUMAN RIGHTS JURISPRUDENCE 110-36 (1996). See generally FRANCIS G. JACOBS & ROBIN
CA. WHITE, THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 222-36 (1986). The four-step
approach proposed by this Comment, while similar to the European Court's analysis, is
more deferential to member States.
[Vol. 30:1
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Then, the European Court proceeds to analyze the cases step by
step." First, because Article 10(1) states that a person has a
right to exercise the rights enumerated in Article 10 without
governmental interference, the European Court begins its
analysis by looking for governmental interference. 8 If it does not
find interference, it dismisses the case.' 9
Assuming the European Court finds interference, it proceeds
to the second element,20  which concerns whether the State
interference is "prescribed by law."2 ' The European Court
interprets this to mean that the law must be "sufficiently precise"
and "adequately accessible;"22 that is, the person 2 must know
what law(s) apply in the given circumstance, and the law(s) must
be precise enough to allow that person to discern the appropriate
behavior in the circumstances." The European Court states that
subsequent national court decisions explaining the law are
sufficient to create the requisite precision to satisfy this part of
Article 10.25 Usually, the Court notes the fact that a law
prohibiting defamation of government officials exists and
proceeds to the next level of analysis. 6
17. See LOUCAIDES, supra note 15, at 183-95. See also discussion infra Part III.
18. LOUCAIDES, supra note 15, at 183-95.
19. See Goodwin v. United Kingdom, 22 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 123 (1996); Vereniging
Weekblad Blufl. v. The Netherlands, 20 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 189 (1995); Prager and
Oberschlick v. Austria, 21 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 1 (1995); Castel] v. Spain, 14 Eur. Ct.
H.R. (ser. A) 445 (1992); Oberschlick v. Austria, 19 Eur. Ct. H.R.(ser. A) 389 (1991); The
Sunday Times v. United Kingdom (No. 2), 14 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 229 (1991); The
Observer and the Guardian v. United Kingdom, 14 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 153 (1991);
Barfod v. Denmark, 13 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 493 (1989); Lingens v. Austria, 8 Eur. Ct.
H.R. (ser. A) 407 (1986).
20. The approach proposed by this Comment does not contain this requirement.
This Comment emphasizes the nature of the law rather than the way the member State
crafted the law and publicizes its existence. See discussion infra Part VI.
21. See JANIS & KAY, supra note 13, at 297-300.
22. LOUCAIDES, supra note 15, at 186-87.




26. See Prager and Oberschlick v. Austria, 21 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 1 (1995); Castell
v. Spain, 14 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 445 (1992); Oberschlick v. Austria, 19 Eur. Ct. H.R.
(ser. A) 389 (1991); Barfod v. Denmark, 13 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 493 (1989); Lingens v.
Austria, 8 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 407 (1986).
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The third element 27 of Article 10 requires the law, which
allegedly circumscribed the expression, to conform with one of
the purposes of Article 10.8 The European Court states
emphatically that it does not tolerate laws that purport to
conform to one of the purposes in Article 10 but actually
undermine the freedoms guaranteed by the Article.29 In the
defamation cases, the European Court does not sustain an appeal
on a law's failure to conform with one of the principles outlined in
the Article."0
1. Permissible Restrictions on Expression
Typically in defamation cases, the European Court has
conducted a perfunctory analysis of the first three elements."'
The fourth element is the crux of Article 10 analysis in
defamation cases. 2 The fourth element of Article 10 provides
that a country can limit the freedoms listed in Article 10 if the
laws limiting the freedoms are "necessary in a democratic
society."" What the European Court has tried to do is balance a
country's desire to accomplish legitimate objectives (for example,
protecting national security or upholding public mores) and a
citizen's right to freedom of expression. 4
27. The approach proposed by this Comment departs from the European Court's
analysis here. While the European Court heavily emphasizes its responsibility to assure
compliance to the European Convention of Human Rights, this Comment gives member
States latitude in interpreting the American Convention. This Comment recommends
that the Inter-American Court restrain member states only in egregious cases. See
discussion infra Part VI.
28. HUMAN RIGHTS: A EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVE, supra note 23, at 203. Article 10
lists the following purposes as legitimate: protecting and maintaining the reputation of
others; the authority and impartiality of the judiciary; public order; morals; national
security; territorial integrity; public safety; public health; and confidential information.
LOUCAIDES, supra note 15, at 189 and COUNCIL OF EUROPE PRESS, supra note 14, at 19.
29. LOUCAIDES, supra note 15, at 189.
30. See Prager and Oberschlick, 21 Eur. Ct. H.R. 1; Castell, 14 Eur. Ct. H.R. 153;
Oberschlick, 19 Eur. Ct. H.R. 389; Barfod, 13 Eur. Ct. H.R. 493; Lingens, 8 Eur. Ct. H.R.
407.
31. See Prager and Oberschlick, 21 Eur. Ct. H.R. 1; Castell, 14 Eur. Ct. H.R. 153;
Oberschlick, 19 Eur. Ct. H.R. 389; Barfod, 13 Eur. Ct. H.R.; Lingens, 8 Eur. Ct. H.R. 407;
see also JACOBS & WHITE, supra note 16, 222-36.
32. See Prager and Oberschlick, 21 Eur. Ct. H.R. 1; Castell, 14 Eur. Ct. H.R. 153;
Oberschlick, 19 Eur. Ct. H.R. 389; Barfod, 13 Eur. Ct. H.R.; Lingens, 8 Eur. Ct. H.R. 407;
see also JACOBS & WHITE, supra note 16, at 226-27.
33. See COUNCIL OF EUROPE PRESS, supra note 14, at 19.
34. See Prager and Oberschlick, 21 Eur. Ct. H.R 1.; Castell, 14 Eur. Ct. H.R. 445;
Oberschlick, 19 Eur. Ct. H.R. 389; Barfod, 13 Eur. Ct. H.R. 493; Lingens, 8 Eur. Ct. H.R.
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Prior to 1979, the balance tilted in favor of the State. During
this period, the European Court adhered to the margin of
appreciation doctrine. The essence of the margin of appreciation
doctrine is that a degree of deference should be granted in
permitting individual national courts to balance a citizen's right
to freedom of expression and a country's desire to accomplish
legitimate objectives.3 Thus, the European Court had held
countries to a standard of reasonableness and good faith in
making and executing laws. 6 In 1979, however, Sunday Times v.
U.K., marked an important turning point in which the European
Court discarded the margin of appreciation doctrine.37 In Sunday
Times, the European Court adopted a standard higher than good
faith, saying that it would sustain a country's law only if the law
satisfies a "pressing social need.""8 The Court has used this
method of analysis to create freedom of expression doctrine
preferential to the individual in defamation law.
2. The European Court Defines "Defamation"
On the narrower issue of defamation, the European Court
classifies an alleged defamatory comment as either an opinion
based on objective information or a value judgment.39 Under the
first classification, when opinion harms the reputation of a
government official, its printing constitutes defamation."0 The
second classification is not considered defamation.4  The
European Court's analysis begins with this distinction, and the
European Court takes the position that national laws curtailing
statements of this former type are permissible, while laws
407.
35. YOUROW, supra note 16, at 110-36.
36. Id., at 113. See also Sunday Times v. United Kingdom, 2 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A)
245 (1979).
37. YOUROW, supra note 16, at 110-20. See also Sunday Times, 2 Eur. Ct. H.R. 245;
see generally MIREILLE DELMAS-MARTY, THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION FOR THE
PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS, PART II 64-66 (1992) (containing useful background
information on the Sunday Times case and its place in case law).
38. YOUROW, supra note 16, at 113; see also Sunday Times, 2 Eur. Ct. H.R. at para.
59.
39. See Prager and Oberschlick, 21 Eur. Ct. H.R. 389; Castell, 14 Eur. Ct. H.R. 229;
Oberschlick, 19 Eur. Ct. H.R. 389; Barfod, 13 Eur. Ct. H.R. 493; Lingens, 8 Eur. Ct. H.R.
407.
40. See Prager and Oberschlick, 21 Eur. Ct. H.R. 389; Barfod, 13 Eur. Ct. H.R. 493
41. Lingens, 8 Eur. Ct. H.R. at para. 45-6; Oberschlick, 19 Eur. Ct. H.R. para. 63-4.
19981
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curtailing the latter are impermissible."
The European Court addressed the first type of statement
(comments classified as an opinion based on objective
information) in two cases: Barfod and Prager and Oberschlick.'
In Barford, the Court distinguished between, on the one
hand, informing the public of verifiable facts and, on the other
hand, expressing opinions, not based on any verifiable facts,
which damage the reputation of the government official."
Barfod, involved a magazine article in which a Danish citizen
accused two judges of bias stemming from a likely conflict of
interest.' Two of the three judges on the panel of a case worked
for the Greenland Local Government, a party to the case.46 The
panel unanimously'upheld a decision by the local government to
tax Danish nationals working on American bases in Greenland.4 7
The European Court noted that the Danish author of the article
could have simply stated the facts surrounding the case and
questioned whether the composition of the court was proper
without attacking the integrity of the court and the reputations
of the judges. 8 Thus, Barfod indicated the type of statement that
the European Court considered defamatory, apparently a
statement which was not based on any verifiable fact and was
unnecessary to give a complete accounting of an event.
Second, the European Court considers as relevant the
behavior of the State.4" In Prager and Oberschlick, the European
Court points out that the national courts in Austria did not
curtail the journalists' right to disseminate information and
concludes that the State acted properly to prevent defamation. 0
This outcome suggests that the conduct of the State could be a
factor in the European Court's determining whether a statement
is defamatory. This outcome also suggests that, if the State is
42. See Prager and Oberschlick, 21 Eur. Ct. H.R. 1; Castell, 14 Eur. Ct. H.R. 445;
Oberschlick, 19 Eur. Ct. H.R. 389; Barfod, 13 Eur. Ct. H.R. 493; Lingens, 8 Eur. Ct. H.R.
407.
43. Barfod, 13 Eur. Ct. H.R. at para. 33 & 35; Prager and Oberschlick, 21 Eur. Ct.
H.R. at para. 35-7.
44. Barfod, 13 Eur. Ct. H.R. at para. 33; Prager and Oberschlick, 21 Eur. Ct. H.R. at
para. 35-7.
45. Barfod, 13 Eur. Ct. H.R. at para. 9. See also YOUROW, supra note 16, at 129.
46. Barfod, 13 Eur. Ct. H.R. at para. 8.
47. Barfod, 13 Eur. Ct. H.R. at para. 8; see generally YOUROW, supra note 16, at 129.
48. Barfod, 13 Eur. Ct. H.R. at para. 33.
49. Prager and Oberschlick, 21 Eur. Ct. H.R. at para. 34.
50. Id.
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not legitimately trying to curtail a journalist's right to
disseminate information, the European Court may find that the
statements were not defamatory. Thus, it seems that the
European Court gives States little ability to protect the
reputation of government officials and assigns itself the
responsibility to determine what is defamation and when a public
official's reputation has been harmed.
The second classification made by the European Court
concerns value judgments. The European Court believes value
judgments cannot be defamatory.51 The seminal case is Lingens,
in which a journalist published several articles about the
Austrian chancellor, Bruno Kreisky.52 Prior to the articles'
publications, Chancellor Kreisky had accused Holocaust survivor
Simon Wiesenthal of using "Mafia methods" in his denunciation
of Freidrich Peter, an Austrian politician." Responding to this
accusation, a newspaper editor characterized the chancellor as
"immoral" and "undignified" and succumbing to the "basest
opportunism."54
The European Court found the newspaper editor's comments
to be value judgments and held that they were not defamatory.
The European Court distinguished between value judgments and
facts, which are subject to proof.55 The European Court further
stated that in the political arena wider deference must be given
to the media as they play an essential role in maintaining a
democracy by allowing an open debate of issues.ir Although the
statements in Lingens and the statements made in Barfod and
Prager and Oberschlick57 appeared to be defamatory, the
distinction between the statements made in these cases was
small. The European Court apparently decided to allow
defamatory comments in the political sphere, while giving
countries a limited ability to sanction defamatory comments
made about government officials, though it was unclear where
51. Lingens v. Austria, 8 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at para. 45-6 (1986).
52. Id. at para. 10-17.
53. Id. at para. 9-17.
54. Id. at para. 18. See generally YOUROW, supra note 16, at 124-25.
55. Lingens, 8 Eur. Ct. H.R. at para. 45-46.
56. Lingens, 8 Eur. Ct. H.R. at para. 41-42. See also YOUROW, supra note 16, at 124-
25.
57. See Barfod v. Denmark, 13 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) para. 9 (1989) where the
applicant accused the judges of bias; see also Prager and Oberschlick v. Austria, 21 Eur.
Ct. H.R (ser. A) para. 32 (1995) where the journalists accused one judge of bias and the
other judge of improper behavior.
2131998]
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the line of distinction resided.
The final aspect of defamation law under the European
Court concerns how broadly the law is applied." In American
jurisprudence, this is known as the "Public Figure" standard."
First, the European Court more readily permits defamation of
politicians." Its explanation for having a lower standard for
politicians and political officials in government is to encourage an
open discussion of political issues.61 In addition, the European
Court believes the lower standard for public figures is necessary
because the press' monitoring of politicians fosters an open and
democratic society., While the European Court has indicated
that this standard is applicable only to politicians,63 it has not
addressed the issue of whether anyone operating in public view
(e.g. a president of a charitable organization, a football coach, or
a police official) is subject to the same standard. It has
suggested, however, that private individuals are subject to
greater protection from defamation.64
Second, it appears that the European Court has divided
defamation into two areas: public and private. Government
officials have some protection from defamation though they must
be willing to accept criticism, even harsh criticism, while private
individuals are afforded more protection from defamation.
B. Conclusion to Part II
The European Court's analysis of defamation law is useful in
considering the direction that the Inter-American Court may
take regarding defamation. Its analysis provides a well-
developed framework that balances the legitimate desire of the
press to inform the public with necessary limits on that
freedom.6" Further, the European Court's doctrine outlines
several relevant issues regarding defamation. First, what is a
58. This part of the European Court's analysis is similar to the third step proposed
by this Comment.
59. See discussion infra Part III.
60. Lingens, 8 Eur. Ct. HR. at para. 41-42.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Oberschlick v. Austria, 19 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at para. 58-59 (1991).
64. Lingens, 8 Eur. Ct. H.R. para. 42.
65. This position is similar to the position taken by several of the international
treaties discussed infra Part IV.
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public figure?66 Second, is the statement a value judgment, a
statement based on verifiable facts, or a statement not based on
verifiable facts which damages the reputation of the government
official? 7 Finally, to what degree should a regional court defer to
the national courts in crafting a doctrine suitable to their
needs? For example, the Inter-American Court could adopt the
margin of appreciation, or it could adopt the European Court's
current, stricter, standard. The European Court in Sunday
Times decided that it was best equipped to decide how to
interpret Article 10;6' in so doing, it discarded the reasonableness
and good faith standard which gave deference to national courts
to decide the meaning and scope of Article 10.7" This decision is
important because it significantly affects the way in which
defamation doctrine is crafted. The Inter-American Court must
decide whether it believes it is better equipped than Latin
American judiciaries to shape this doctrine for member nations
or whether it should step back from crafting stringent rules and
allow a common Inter-American doctrine to percolate up from the
member nations.
III. THE UNITED STATES' APPROACH
Defamation law in the United States offers the Inter-
American Court both legal arguments and policy approaches.
The U.S. Supreme Court has adopted and defined an actual
malice standard. Another rule that the Inter-American court
might find helpful is the U.S. Supreme Court's definition of
"public figure." Moreover, the U.S. Supreme Court offers
substantial precedent that may assist the Inter-American Court
in avoiding decisions that would chill robust political debate,
essential to any democracy, but perhaps especially important to
democracies in their infancies.
66. See discussion supra Part II.A.2 and accompanying footnotes analyzing the
public figure standard in the European Court.
67. See Prager and Oberschlick v. Austria, 21 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 1 (1995); Castell
v. Spain, 14 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 445 (1992); Oberschlick v. Austria, 19 Eur. Ct. H.R.
(ser. A) 389 (1991); Barfod v. Denmark, 13 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 493 (1989); Lingens v.
Austria, 8 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 407 (1986).
68. YOUROW, supra note 16, at 113. See also Sunday Times v. United Kingdom, 2
Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 245 (1979); see generally DELMAS-MARTY, supra note 37, at 64-66.
69. Sunday Times, 2 Eur. Ct. H.R. at para. 59.




In N.Y Times Co. v. Sullivan,71 the Committee to Defend
Martin Luther King and The Struggle for Freedom in the South
placed an advertisement in the New York Times communicating
information, expressing grievances, reciting opinions and seeking
financial support on behalf of African-Americans' right to vote
movement. The advertisement stated:
In Montgomery, Alabama, after students sang 'My Country,
'Tis of Thee' on the State Capitol steps, their leaders were
expelled from school, and truckloads of police armed with
shotguns and tear-gas ringed the Alabama State College
Campus. When the entire student body protested to state
authorities by refusing to re-register, their dining hall was
padlocked in an attempt to starve them into submission.72
The advertisement continued:
Again and again the Southern violators have answered Dr.
King's peaceful protests with intimidation and violence. They
have bombed his home almost killing his wife and child. They
have assaulted his person. They have arrested him seven
times-for 'speeding,' 'loitering' and similar 'offenses.' And
now they have charged him with 'perjury'-a felony under
which they could imprison him for ten years ....73
Sullivan, an elected official of the City of Montgomery, sued
the New York Times alleging that the advertisement was
factually inaccurate and defamatory.7" Sullivan claimed that
while the police were deployed, they did not ring the campus as
the advertisement had stipulated, that the protest was not
attended by the entire student body, that the hall had never
actually been padlocked and that Dr. King had not been arrested
seven times." The newspaper publisher and clergymen whose
names appeared in the advertisement refused to print a
retraction and refused to acknowledge any wrongdoing against
71. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
72. Id. at 257.
73. Id. at 257-58.
74. Id. at 258.
75. Id. at 259.
[Vol. 30:1
DEFAMATION & FREE PRESS
the plaintiffs." The Alabama State Court applied a strict
liability malice standard and found in favor of the plaintiffs. The
Court construed defendant's failure to issue a retraction as
malice.
The Times appealed, and the U.S. Supreme Court granted
certiorari to address for the first time, the extent to which
constitutional protection of freedom of speech and press would
place a limit on a state's power to award damages in a
defamation suit bought by a public official in his official
capacity.77 The U.S. Supreme Court viewed the Alabama Court's
application of a strict liability standard as an abridgment of free
speech and press as protected by the first amendment." The
Supreme Court asserted that the press, if compelled to guarantee
the veracity of its statements with an impending defamation suit
for each factually inaccurate line, would in effect have to
implement self-censorship for fear of continual litigation.79 The
Supreme Court opined that such a rule would be inconsistent
with the first amendment, would discourage robust debate and
would infringe upon the people's democratic right to cast
criticism." Additionally, the Court worried that putatively true
statements which were believed to be true would not be
disseminated for fear that, subsequently, they would be found to
be false and the newspaper vulnerable to suit."'
To avoid such negative impacts, the Supreme Court adopted
an actual malice standard that must be met for public officials to
recover damages from defamatory falsehoods. 2 To prove liability
for defamation, this standard requires a showing of false or reck-
76. Id. at 261.
77. WALTER BERNS, THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND THE FUTURE OF AMERICAN
DEMOCRACY 147 (1976). The U.S. Supreme Court was not presented with a case involving
free press, speech or political dissent until 1919. Id. By that time, nearly thirteen
decades after the country's inception, over two thousand newspapers had been
established. JEREMY COHEN, CONGRESS SHALL MAKE No LAW 3 (1989). When the
Supreme Court finally did take a first amendment case, it was in the context of war and
had more to do with sedition than freedom of the press. Schenck v. United States, 249
U.S. 47 (1919). See also, JEREMY COHEN, OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE FIRST
AMENDMENT, AND JUDICIAL DECISION MAKING (1989).
78. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 283.
79. Id. at 278.
80. Id. at 270.
81. Id. at 277.
82. Id. at 280.
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less disregard for whether or not information is false or a
showing of actual knowledge that the information is false."'
Based on the Supreme Court's view that the possible harm of
presenting factually inaccurate and defamatory information is
outweighed by the interest in promoting free press," the Sullivan
rationale is employed by courts today when dealing with
defamation issues." The U.S. Constitution, as interpreted by
Sullivan, recognizes the need for the press to have the freedom to
publish material that may be false."
B. Standard of Verification
While Sullivan established a methodology for reviewing
defamation cases, it left several unanswered questions. The
Times advertisement was a clear example of inadvertent error in
publication that did not meet the actual malice standard.87 The
Supreme Court never reached the point of defining the reckless
disregard for truth espoused by Brennan in Sullivan as a
requisite showing for defamation. The Supreme Court addressed
this issue in St. Amant v. Thompson8 when it adopted a standard
of verification. In St. Amant petitioner, a candidate for public
office made a televised speech.89 In the course of the speech,
petitioner read a series of questions and answers." The answers
falsely charged respondent, a public official, with criminal
conduct.91 The Supreme Court ruled that petitioner had failed to
verify whether the information that he relayed was true but held
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. See Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 (1988); Andreson v. Liberty Lobby
Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (1986); Bose Corp. v. Consumer's Union, 466 U.S. 485 (1984);
Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111 (1979); Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448 (1976);
Cantrell v. Forest City Pub. Co., 419 U.S. 245 (1974); Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418
U.S. 323 (1974); Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974);
Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, 403 U.S. 29 (1971); Ginzburg v. Goldwater, 396 U.S. 1049
(1970); St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727 (1968); Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75
(1966); Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64 (1964); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376
U.S. 254 (1964); Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250 (1952); Green v. Alton Telegraph,
438 N.E.2d 203 (1982).
86. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 271.
87. Id.
88. St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727 (1968).
89. Id. at 728.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 728-29.
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that "[t]here must be sufficient evidence to permit the conclusion
that the defendant in fact entertained serious doubts as to the
truth of his publication," before liability will be found.2 The
Supreme Court also determined that a story cannot be
fabricated, be a product of the reporter's imagination, or be based
on an unidentified anonymous telephone call.9"
C. "Public Figure" Defined
Sullivan left another unanswered question-namely who
qualifies as a public official subject to the actual malice
standard? Over the years, the Supreme Court has provided an
expansive category of public figure. For example, in Rosenblatt v.
Baer,4 the Supreme Court extended the actual malice standard
to cover not only public officials but private citizens also. In
Rosenblatt Baer, a supervisor of a county recreation area, sued
the publisher of Laconica Evening Citizen because Laconica
printed an article that implied that he had mismanaged
$31,000.9 The Supreme Court held that Baer was a public
official and that he failed to prove actual malice.96 Writing on
behalf of the Court, Brennan asserted that "we honor the
commitment to robust debate on public issues, which is embodied
in the first amendment, by extending constitutional protection to
all discussion and communication involving matters of public or
general concern."97 As press editors are not likely to print that
which is not of "general concern," in essence the Supreme Court
extended the actual malice standard to cover not only public
individuals but private citizens as well. 8 One year later the
Supreme Court determined that both a football coach99 and a riot
leader... were public figures. These cases established that a
public official was not only someone who works for the
government or who participates in politics.'01
92. Id. at 731.
93. Id. at 733.
94. Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75 (1966).
95. Id. at 77-78.
96. Id. at 76.
97. Id.
98. PETER E. KANE, ERRORS, LIES, AND LIBEL 73 (1992).
99. Curtis Pub. Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967).
100. Associated Press v. Walker, 379 U.S. 47 (1964).
101. See Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75 (1966); Butts, 388 U.S. at 130; Walker, 379
U.S. at 47. This view is in contrast to desacato laws, which are primarily aimed at
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The Supreme Court clarified the public/private distinction in
Gertz v. Welch when it held that public figures were those
individuals who had thrust themselves to the forefront of
particular public controversies with the purpose of influencing
resolution of the issues involved. The Court excluded from its
definition of "public persons" individuals who had been
involuntarily drawn in to controversies."'
After establishing the actual malice standard, the Supreme
Court directed its attention to one's right to reply to defamatory
press.02 In Miami Herald v. Tornillo, the Court held that there
is no constitutional right of the defamed party to reply to
personal attack."' The Supreme Court further stated that any
government effort to mandate the right of reply insofar as the
print media are concerned would violate the first amendment."'
D. Conclusion to Part III
The U.S. Supreme Court's defamation doctrine is comprised
of four elements that are useful for the Inter-American Court.
First, the press is not held to a standard of knowing that the
information it prints is true based on the theory that it would
discourage robust debate and people's democratic right to cast
criticism. Second, a reporter is prohibited from printing a story
that the reporter knows is false. The Court recognizes that
government officials. While U.S. defamation law concerns itself with defaming public
figures in general, Latin American desacato laws refer to public officials only. However,
this does not preclude a focused comparison of the systems because the U.S. definition of
public figure, even as later amended, includes public officials.
102. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
103. Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974).
104. Id.
105. Id. This issue is one of immense importance as it arguably undermines the
rationale behind the holding in New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). The
Supreme Court in Sullivan was concerned that there would be no debate should the
standard in defamation fall below actual malice. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 270. The Court
further felt that public figures inherently had a way of responding because of their public
roles. Id. It was this ability to respond in an equally public forum to the press' alleged
defamatory statements that compelled the Court to create a standard as high as actual
malice. Id. But that ability to reply has been severely curtailed after Tornillo, as there is
no constitutional right to reply. See Tornillo, 418 U.S. at 241. Today's technologically
advanced media is very pervasive. If the media engages in the type of behavior allowed
under Sullivan, (printing of factually inaccurate statements as long as they are not
printed with actual malice or a wanton disregard for proof) a factually inaccurate "story"
can be spread across the globe in a number of minutes. Clearly, the rationale behind
Sullivan has been strained.
220 [Vol. 30:1
DEFAMATION & FREE PRESS
information exists in the middle between what is known to be
true and that which is known to be false. The press is given the
benefit of the doubt in this middle area. Third, a public official is
an individual who has thrust himself to the forefront of public
debate and thus, must expect criticism. Fourth, there is no
constitutional right of reply. The U.S. formulation is one possible
blueprint that the Inter-American Court should note as it con-
siders the implication of defamation doctrine in Latin America.
IV. INTERNATIONAL TREATIES
In addition to the viewpoints of the European and U.S.
Courts, the Inter-American Court may consider several
international treaties as it develops its own approach to
defamation law. These treaties provide insight into defamation
law because they reflect international norms existing among
nations. Presumably, a norm that is found in many treaties has
more customary authority than one acknowledged in fewer
treaties and other instruments."' The greater the number of
treaties espousing the same norm, the greater the likelihood the
Inter-American Court will adhere to this norm, particularly if
numerous Latin American countries are signatories to the
documents."7 For this reason, it is useful to analyze several
international documents to determine the precise nature of the
international norm surrounding defamation law 8 so that one can
speculate as to the degree to which the Inter-American Court
may be influenced by international custom.
A. The International Instruments
Besides the American Convention, there are four major
international instruments that address freedom of expression.They are the African Convention, 0. the European Convention,"'
106. Amit Mukherjee, International Protection of Journalists: Problem, Practice, and
Prospects, 11 ARIZ. J. INT'L. & COMP. L.J. 339, 355 (1994).
107. Advisory Opinion, supra note 11, at para. 51.
108. The discussion of press freedom and the extent to which the press should not be
sanctioned for defamation is often couched in terms of "freedom of expression."
109. Mukherjee, supra note 106, at 355.
110. African [Banjul] Charter on Human and People's Rights, June 27, 1981, OAU
Doc. CAB/LEB/67/3 rev. 5 [hereinafter African Charter].
111. COUNCIL OF EUROPE PRESS, supra note 14.
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the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,"' and
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights."' These documents
create three categories of rights:
1. Rights which cannot be limited under any circumstances,
for example freedom from slavery and torture;
2. Rights in which restrictions are permissible only during a
state of emergency, for example, the right to be free from
submission to forced labor;
3. Rights in which restrictions are permissible even when there
is not a state of emergency, for example freedom of
114expression.
This third category suggests that the international norm
concerning freedom of expression includes the right of a society to
limit expression under certain circumstances. Deciphering the
scope of the limitation requires further analysis.
Taken together these instruments contain three criteria for a
permissible restriction on expression: legality, legitimacy, and
democratic necessity."1 Legality is satisfied if there is a law in
the country permitting the restriction."' Legitimacy is satisfied
as long as the law meets one of the objectives enumerated in the
governing treaty."7 The third permissible restriction, democratic
necessity, is included only in the European Convention, thus it is
not discussed here."8
Some documents have unique features. For example, the
European Convention contains additional justifications for
112. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, No. 2200A
[hereinafter International Covenant].
113. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Dec. 10, 1948, No. 217 A (11I)
[hereinafter Universal Declaration].
114. Mukherjee, supra note 106, at 357-58.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id. There are four objectives common in these documents: respect for the rights
or the reputations of others; national security; public order or safety; and the protection of
public health or morals. African Charter, supra note 110, art. 29; International Covenant,
supra note 112, art. 19; Universal Declaration, supra note 113, art. 29; COUNCIL OF
EUROPE PRESS, supra note 14, at 19.
118. Mukherjee, supra note 106, at 359.
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limiting expression discussed in Part II. Further, the
Universal Declaration, while containing a general limitation of
rights at the end of the document, does not contain any explicit
limitation on freedom of expression.120 Broad similarities can be
drawn, however. Generally, limits on expression espoused in
these international treaties indicate that the drafters wanted to
balance three considerations: a desire for unlimited freedom of
expression; a society's legitimate desire to curtail expression that
harms other people and society generally; and governmental
abuse.
B. Interpretations by Institutions and Governments
In light of this desire for balance, it is useful to consider how
international institutions and governments have interpreted
treaties that address freedom of expression. The U.N.
Commission on Human Rights (Commission) takes the position
that expression is "essential" to ensure participation in self-
governance and realization of all the rights contained in
international human rights instruments. 2' In addition, the
Commission believes that the scope of the protection of
expression in the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights (ICCPR) is comprehensive and should be limited only as
necessary "for the respect of the rights and reputations of others,
or for the protection of national security or public order... or of
public health or morals.... ,,2 The Commission points out that
restrictions on expression, particularly public order, are vague.123
It also believes that there is a risk that governments will
misinterpret the scope of this limitation to unjustifiably curtail
freedom of expression, thereby undermining the Covenant and
the right."' Under the Commission's view, freedom of expression
119. COUNCIL OF EUROPE PRESS, supra note 14, at 19.
120. See generally Universal Declaration, supra note 113.
121. UNITED NATIONS, HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, COMMISSION ON
HUMAN RIGHTS, RIGHT TO FREEDOM OF OPINION AND EXPRESSION (1996) [hereinafter
RIGHT TO FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION].
122. Id.
123. UNITED NATIONS, ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COUNCIL, COMMISSION ON HUMAN
RIGHTS, QUESTION OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS OF ALL PERSONS SUBJECTED TO ANY FORM OF
DETENTION OR IMPRISONMENT; REPORT OF THE SPECIAL RAPPORTEUR, MR. ABID HUSSAIN,
PURSUANT TO COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, Res. 1996/53, U.N. DOC. EICN.411997/31
[hereinafter U.N. IMPRISONMENT REPORT].
124. Id. at Intro.
19981
INTER-AMERICAN LAW REVIEW
should be restricted by a State only if it is necessary, which
essentially means that restrictions should be narrowly
construed.'25 The Commission goes even further, saying that
"[a]s a general rule, States should not invoke any custom,
tradition or religious considerations to avoid meeting their
obligations with respect to the safeguarding of the right to
freedom of expression."'26  In short, the Commission's
interpretation of the ICCPR and, undoubtedly, other documents
with similar language concerning expression favors individual
expression.
The signatories of these treaties conduct their own
interpretations as well. Some of these countries stress the
importance of curtailing freedom of expression to maintain
democratic stability.'27  For example, in the Seventh Ibero-
American Summit 1s  in November 1997, Latin American
countries stated that journalists should avoid disseminating
untruthful information as it tends to destabilize their nascent
democracies." 9 In addition, fourteen Latin American countries
have desacato laws to prevent journalists from destabilizing their
governments."' Argentina and Colombia also attempt to rein in
journalists' abusing their right to freedom of expression."' These
two countries try to control the dissemination of misinformation
in the media by actively enforcing laws that prohibit defamation
of government officials. 2 Their interpretations provide another
option for the Inter-American Court.
C. Conclusion to Part IV
The foregoing international treaties provide a framework
for the Inter-American Court as it develops its own approach to
125. Id. at 2.
126. Id.
127. See generally Declaracion de Margarita, VII Cumbre, Nov. 8, 1997, available at
<http:www.cumbreiberoamericana.com!> (visited Feb. 4, 1999).
128. See discussion infra Part VII.
129. Declaracion de Margarita, supra note 127, at ch. 6.
130. Desacato laws are a class of legislation that criminalize expression which
offends, insults, or threatens a public official in their official capacity. Inter-American
Commission Annual Report, supra note 12, at 201. The fourteen countries that have
desacato laws are Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Costa Rica, Cuba, Ecuador, El Salvador,
Guatemala, Haiti, Mexico, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela. Id.
131. See generally Declaracion de Margarita, supra note 127.
132. See IAPA REPORT, supra note 1, at 5, 23.
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defamation. There are two principal positions within this
framework. First is a belief in a virtually unfettered right to
express oneself publicly. 3 The desire to protect free expression
from almost all restrictions is the touchstone of this position."'
The U.S. Supreme Court and the Commission exemplify the
extreme end of this view. A second position, at the other end of
the spectrum, is that expression should be carefully
circumscribed to conform to the needs and mores of society."
Latin American countries that have desacato laws exemplify this
view. Between these two extremes lies a carefully crafted model
that attempts to curtail egregious behavior. This model, which
reflects most of the international treaties, is exemplified by the
European Court.'36 The European model, by attempting to avoid
egregious abuses of governmental control and abuses of freedom
of expression, could be one that the Inter-American Court
chooses to adopt because limited expression is a well-established
international norm embodied in the American Convention.
V. THE INTER-AMERICAN COURT'S PROBABLE COURSE OF
ACTION
Given the contributions made by foreign courts and
institutions, the Inter-American Court is likely to craft a
defamation doctrine protective of the press' right to disseminate
information, a right protected by Article 13."' In using a doctrine
similar to the one developed by the European Court, the Inter-
American Court will likely find desacato laws to be in violation of
Article 13 and will narrowly construe defamation laws as they
pertain to political and government officials.
133. This assertion is based on an analysis of the U.S. Supreme Court's treatment of
defamation and the U.N.'s position as expressed by the U.N. Commission on Human
Rights. See discussion supra Part III. See also RIGHT TO FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION, supra
note 121.
134. RIGHT TO FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION, supra note 121.
135. This conclusion is based on an analysis of the African Charter, the European
Convention, and the study conducted by the U.N. Commission on Human Rights. See
African Charter, supra note 110; COUNCIL OF EUROPE PRESS, supra note 14; U.N.
IMPRISONMENT REPORT, supra note 123. These documents indicate that numerous
countries believe that citizens do not have an unfettered right to free expression and that
the right to free expression ceases when harm to society occurs.
136. This statement is a conclusion based on an analysis of Parts II-IV of this
Comment.
137. For the full text of Article 13, see supra text accompanying note 9.
1998]
INTER-AMERICAN LAW REVIEW
There are a number of reasons why the Inter-American
Court is likely to choose this deferential approach. First, this
approach is consistent with that of other prominent courts and
institutions. The Inter-American Court has acknowledged that
this consistency is relevant in considering how to analyze
freedom of expression.' Second, according to the Inter-American
Court, the American Convention is slightly more protective of
expression than most of the international instruments discussed
in Part IV."' Third, the Inter-American Commission has already
followed the European Court's analysis regarding desacato
laws.14 Last, the Inter-American Court's analysis in a 1985
advisory opinion relating to expression is similar to the European
Court's analysis.'
In its 1985 advisory opinion, the Inter-American Court
emphasized that the country imposing limitations on expression
must show that the restriction imposed is proportionate to the
country's objective.' The Inter-American Court has gone so far
as to say that it is not sufficient for a government to cite one of
the permissible limitations on freedom of expression alone;
rather, the limitation must also be "necessary" in a democratic
society.' This is the crux of the analysis. The Inter-American
Court states that "necessary" must be more than "useful,"
"reasonable," or "desirable.""' The Inter-American Court's
standard is that a restriction is "'necessary when it can be shown
that the measure cannot reasonably be achieved through a
means less restrictive."' This interpretation is similar to that of
the European Court. 4 6 Given this similarity and the other
reasons discussed above, the Inter-American Court is likely to
follow the path hewn by the European Court.
138. Advisory Opinion, supra note 11, para. 51.
139. Id.
140. See generally Inter-American Commission Annual Report, supra note 12, ch. V.
141. Id. at 205.
142. Id. at 209-10.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 209-10. The Inter-American Commission suggests that "necessary" should
imply the standard "pressing social need" used in The Sunday Times v. United Kingdom.
See Inter-American Commission Annual Report, supra note 12, at 209-10; The Sunday
Times v. United Kingdom (No. 2), 14 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) para. 59 (1991).
145. Advisory Opinion, supra note 11, para. 79.
146. Prager and Oberschlick v. Austria, 21 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 1 (1995); Castell v.
Spain, 14 Eur. Ct. H.I. (ser. A) 445 (1992); Oberschlick v. Austria, 19 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser.
A) 389 (1991); Barfod v. Denmark, 13 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 493 (1989); Lingens v.
Austria, 8 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 407 (1986).
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Given the likelihood of the Inter-American Court's direction,
the development of its defamation doctrine will likely proceed as
follows. First, regarding desacato laws, the Inter-American
Court is likely to follow the lead of the Commission, which ruled
strongly against the laws, principally because desacato laws
would be viewed as disproportionate to the ends desired."' In
addition, desacato laws are not necessary in a democratic society;
in fact, they inhibit democracy.' Second, regarding the issue of
who is defined as a "public figure," the Inter-American Court is
likely to extend this definition to include at least political and
governmental figures because this has been the focus of
defamation analysis in the European Court and the U.S.
Supreme Court. 49  However, the Inter-American Court will
probably not extend the definition as far as the U.S. Supreme
Court '5 because doing so is beyond the scope of the debate of this
issue in Latin America.15' The Latin American debate concerning
free expression of the press has been focused on information
related to government officials and politicians.52  Finally,
regarding the types of statements the press may publish, the
Inter-American Court will likely condone the publication of
truthful information but not opinions that are presented as
truthful information. The Inter-American Court is not likely to
accept the U.S. Supreme Court's standard (information which is
not known to be false can be printed) because the European
standard, more accurately than the U.S. Court, captures the type
of defamation currently at issue in Latin America.
147. See generally Inter-American Commission Annual Report, supra note 12, at 206-
12.
148. Id. at 209.
149. This conclusion is based on the analyses supra Parts II and III.
150. See relevant U.S. cases cited supra Part III.
151. See generally IAPA REPORT, supra note 1; Advisory Opinion, supra note 11;
Andres Oppenheimer Summit Will Take Up Ethics of the Press, MIAMI HERALD, Nov. 3,
1997, at A10.
152. See generally IAPA REPORT, supra note 1; Advisory Opinion, supra note 11;
Oppenheimer, supra note 151, at A10.
19981 227
INTER-AMERICAN LAW REVIEW
VI. WHAT THE COURT SHOULD Do
A. Introduction
This Comment presents two principle recommendations for
the Inter-American Court. First, it recommends deference to
members of the Organization of American States (OAS), allowing
them to craft a defamation doctrine suitable to their needs in all
but the most egregious cases. Second, it recommends that the
Inter-American Court and member nations craft defamation
doctrine in such a way as to permit the press to publish
substantiated information about public figures while prohibiting
the printing of information which the journalist knows to be false
or the printing of opinion based only on facts that are
misrepresented as true.
B. The Experiences of Europe and the United
States
This Comment recommends deference based on the principle
that different countries have contrasting experiences which
necessitate crafting distinct solutions. Regarding defamation,
both Europe and the U.S. exemplify this principle and have
forged systems for dealing with defamation with the aid of the
European Convention and the U.S. Constitution, respectively.
153
The road, however, has been neither simple nor direct.
Both Europe and the U.S. adhere to the belief that a system
must have the capacity to allow law to evolve. To be viable, a
153. See Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 (1988); Andreson v. Liberty Lobby
Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (1986); Bose Corp. v. Consumer's Union, 466 U.S. 485 (1984);
Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111 (1979); Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448 (1976);
Cantrell v. Forest City Pub. Co., 419 U.S. 245 (1974); Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418
U.S. 323 (1974); Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974);
Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, 403 U.S. 29 (1971); Ginzburg v. Goldwater, 396 U.S. 1049
(1970); St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727 (1968); Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75
(1966); Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64 (1964); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376
U.S. 254 (1964); Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250 (1952); Green v. Alton Telegraph,
438 N.E.2d 203 (1982). See also cases cited, supra note 19.
154. See discussion supra Parts II and III.
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system must be fluid and must consider more than mere
idealism. Fluidity is clearly demonstrable in the European and
U.S. Courts where defamation law has undergone considerable
change in the last several decades.
In Latin America as well, malleability is critical as it allows
for adaptation essential to dynamic Latin American societies.155
Whereas the U.S. Supreme Court has the ability to create the
law, without significant threat from either its coequal branches
or the states, the Inter-American Court is not vested with the
same degree of power."' The U.S. Supreme Court is an old court,
well established and respected. It has attained a degree of
legitimacy in the U.S. that the Inter-American Court has never
attained in Latin America.157 Thus, the approach the U.S.
Supreme Court takes cannot be the same approach used by the
Inter-American Court. Rather, the Inter-American Court must
be considerably more deferential to its member countries for a
viable system of defamation law to develop. 58  However, the
Inter-American Court has a measure of political clout,'55 so it
need only be deferential to a degree. 6'
While adhering to the underlying theory of deference, the
Inter-American Court should adopt a multi-step approach in
dealing with defamation cases."'
155. Latin America, because of the emergence of new democracies, is in a state of flux
and setting any law in stone when a country is in transition is not only unrealistic but
untenable. Specifically with regard to free press and defamation in countries who have
histories littered with repression of speech and press, this could create disarray and
anarchy in the crucial evolutionary period for a country.
156. INTER-AMERICAN COURT ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 2, at 7-10.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Several member countries require the Inter-American Court's intervention in
other matters; thus, the Court has some degree of leverage. See Thomas Buergenthal,
The Inter-American Court of Human Rights, 76 AM J. INT'L L. 233 (1982).
160. The parallel here between the proposed four-step approach and the history of the
U.S. Supreme Court warrants some discussion. The U.S. Supreme Court, early in its
history, elected a deferential route and allowed the President and Congress considerable
latitude while it established for itself the power of judicial review. See Marbury v.
Madison 5 U.S. 137 (1803). Because the Inter-American Court does not enjoy the same
power, it must first establish its legitimacy before taking on an assertive role. The Inter-
American Court can slowly legitimize itself as a power in the shaping of justice in the
region through incremental steps. In this regard, it is perhaps a good thing that the
Inter-American Court has not taken a defamation case yet, for it, like the early Supreme
Court may not have been ready to broach the subject of criticism of public officials before
strengthening its own legitimacy.
161. This sort of analysis will help legitimize the Inter-American Court as an
objective body that follows norms, not countries.
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C. Step One: Evaluation of the Law
The first step of the Inter-American Court's analysis should
be an evaluation of the law in question to determine whether the
law comports facially with the American Convention. There are
two types of laws that are a per se violation of the Convention.
Such laws require prison time (i.e. desacato laws) and prohibit in
any manner the printing of substantiated information, even if it
harms the dignity of the public figure or government, except in
cases of national security.
The Inter-American Court should eliminate desacato laws
because such laws violate the American Convention for several
reasons. First, these clauses have a substantial chilling effect on
the dissemination of information that facially contrasts the
American Convention.162  In addition, desacato laws are
disproportionate because they provide for a penal remedy,
whereas the American Convention only permits civil remedies for
Article 13 cases. 16  Second, deterring public discussion and
debate of government and politics undermines a core premise of
the democratic process. Anything as drastic as sentencing
someone to prison for disseminating opinions or ideas is contrary
to the sort of robust debate paramount in a democratic system
envisioned by the U.S. Supreme Court and the European Court.
The European and U.S. Courts concur and note that restrictive
regulations should only be applied when necessary."' 4 This is
particularly important in emerging democracies as there is a
great need to encourage rather than discourage robust debate.
The U.N. notes that freedom of expression interrelates with and
enhances all other human rights and that deterring freedom of
expression has a far-reaching impact. 6' Finally, desacato laws
simply do not work. For example, Argentina and Egypt had very
strict insult laws that called for imprisonment and heavy fines.'66
These laws did not deter journalists in either country; rather,
journalists continued to take risks to exercise their right to dis-
162. Inter-American Commission Annual Report, supra note 12, at 208-09.
163. American Convention, supra note 8.
164. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964); Lingens v. Austria, 8 Eur.
Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 407 (1986).
165. RIGHT TO FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION, supra note 121.
166. INTER AMERICAN PRESS ASSOCIATION, DESACATO LAws 6 (1996).
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seminate substantiated information." 7 In essence, desacato laws
are not effective for the intended purpose.
Further, the Court should eliminate laws that prohibit the
printing of a public official's substantiated violation of the law.""
Because these are substantiated pieces of information, the public
should be allowed access to them as a right guaranteed by Article
13. One of the defining characteristics of a democratic system is
that the citizenry has a voice in crafting national interest. To
participate intelligently in politics, the arena that forges national
policy, the citizenry needs to be aware of its public officials'
activities. For these reasons, this proposed first step (evaluating
the law in question) provides a better vehicle to promote the
ideals of the American Convention than the Inter-American
Court's present use of its first two steps of analysis.
Presently, the Inter-American Court's analysis begins with
whether there is a law justifying the government's infringement
on the individual's freedom of expression (step one) and whether
there are "express and precise" definitions for the grounds of the
law (step two.)169 The Inter-American Court assumes that there
has been an infringement if the act in question is associated with
imparting or receiving information.17  This, however, is an
inappropriate place to begin defamation analysis because the
American Convention establishes limitations on freedom of
expression. Because the American Convention allows for
limitations, one cannot assume that the curtailing of a
journalist's ability to impart information represents the indicia
requisite for a violation of Article 13. In other words, the Inter-
American Court presupposes that a government has necessarily
infringed upon a journalist's right to impart information, without
regard to whether such a right exists as to the information in
question. Assuming that any action taken by a journalist is a
right protected by Article 13 is a misinterpretation because
Article 13 places limits on expression. For example, harming a
person's reputation by misrepresenting the facts is not freedom of
expression protected by Article 13. The Inter-American Court's
analysis should be replaced by an evaluation of the law in
question without an assumption that a right has been violated
167. Id.
168. The one exception is in national security situations.




and with an eye towards whether the government's actions
comport with Article 13.
To conclude, the proposed first step has two purposes. One,
it is designed to eliminate egregious laws which have a
substantial chilling effect on the dissemination of information
essential in a democracy, i.e. information pertaining to
government and politics. By eliminating desacato laws and laws
which prohibit printing substantiated information, except in
cases of national security, this step fosters the kind of robust
debate envisioned by the U.S. Supreme Court. 7' Two, this step
reorients the focus of defamation law to the proper meaning of
Article 13 of the American Convention.
D. Step Two: Deference to Member Nations
After completing step one, the second step is a good faith
determination. The Inter-American Court should follow the
margin of appreciation doctrine by giving a great degree of
deference to its member nations when they interpret defamation
doctrine and make individual rulings on defamation cases. At
the same time-the Inter-American Court should determine
whether its members exercised good faith in their interpretation
and ruling. A key assumption of this proposed second step is
that there is more than one interpretation of defamation doctrine
that comports with the American Convention. For the Inter-
American Court, acceptance of the member nation's
interpretation should turn on whether the national authorities
exercise good faith in evaluating the case. If the answer to this
question is affirmative, then the Inter-American Court should let
stand the ruling made by its members' national court.
In determining whether the national court has acted in good
faith, the Inter-American Court should consider, but not confine
itself to, the following considerations: (1) whether the national
court has followed the duly enacted laws; (2) whether the judge
in the case is a known supporter/sympathizer of the public figure
in question; (3) the party who appointed the judge; (4) the party
responsible for compensating the judge; (5) the extent to which
other methods are available for the government to curtail press
171. See generally New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
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speech; and (6) the presence or absence of a vibrant press in the
country.'72
Adjudication by the national court can still be in good faith
regardless of the answers to these pertinent questions, but
suspicion will be raised if, for instance, the party in question
appointed the judge to the bench and the same party is
responsible for the judge's compensation. If the country has not
exercised good faith or the facts are such that there is reasonable
uncertainty as to whether the national court acted in good faith,
then the Inter-American Court should engage in the third and
fourth steps of the analysis.173 If the country has acted in good
faith, then the analysis should end here, and the Inter-American
Court should accept the national court's ruling. At this stage, the
Inter-American Court will already have evaluated the law,
determined its consistency with the American Convention, and
determined that the country has acted with good faith and in
accordance with its own laws.
E. Step Three: Definition of "Public Figure"
The purpose of the third step is to construct a narrow
definition of "public figure" that is consistent with the margin of
appreciation doctrine and to determine whether an alleged
defamatory act relates to a public figure.
The Court should define a "public figure" as a person who:
a. works / worked for a local, municipal, or national
government in an official capacity;
b. works / worked for the government but who is / was not
officially employed for the government;
c. participates / participated in politics; or
d. falls into either a, b, or c above and, in his or her private
capacity, violates or allegedly violates a law (whether found by a
court to have breached the law or not).'74
172. If the press is vibrant, the law may be doing no harm.
173. The third and fourth steps of the analysis will appear later in the text.
174. This definition was created as a result of the analysis of both U.S. and European
cases. Most of the cases dealt with individuals who were public officials at some level.
See discussion supra Part III; see also European cases cited supra note 19.
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This definition does several things. It gives the press an
unlimited right to publish substantiated facts (except in cases of
national security) about individuals who participate in politics
and government. In so doing, it provides members of the press
the right to comment freely about issues critical to the
preservation of democracy. At the same time, this definition
recognizes that there are limits to expression and allows each
member nation to determine what those limits should be. Thus,
this definition is consistent with the margin of appreciation...
because it does not permit the Inter-American Court to define the
limits of expression in all cases, only those critical to the
preservation of democracy. Further, this definition focuses on
public activity that egregiously impedes democracy. It is
designed to encourage investigative journalism in which the
public has a vested interest, while discouraging the press from
publishing stories that do not have a bearing on the preservation
of democracy, such as activities in a person's private life.
A closer analysis of the public figure definition is useful to
understand its scope. The first part' of the definition recognizes
that the press should aggressively cover and publish stories
about illegal or questionable activities. This rests on the theory
that government officials have a significant amount of power at
their disposal to corrupt the government and stifle democracy;
consequently, transparency of officials is essential. Further, to
ensure transparency, this definition extends to someone whose
illegal activity was not uncovered while that individual was
working in government or politics. Mere lapse of time should not
cleanse a dirty rag.
The second part of the public figure definition17 encourages
the press to report clandestine behavior. At times, corrupt
officials and politicians pay individuals who do not work for the
175. The margin of appreciation doctrine in the European Court has changed over
time. The position taken in this Comment is similar to the European margin of
appreciation doctrine expressed in Handyside v. United Kingdom, 1 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A)
737 (1976). Under Handyside, the European Court adopted a position of deference. Id.
Since Handyside, the European Court has moved away from its position of deference and
toward a position of activism. See YOUROW, supra note 16, at 110-36 for a full discussion
of the Handyside case and the development of the margin of appreciation as it relates to
freedom of expression in the European Court.
176. Part one states: "a person who works / worked for a local, municipal, or national
government in an official capacity."
177. Part two states: "a person who works / worked for the government but who is /
was not officially employed for the government."
234 [Vol. 30:1
DEFAMATION & FREE PRESS
government to conduct illegal activity. This type of activity has a
deleterious effect on democracy because of its potential for abuse.
For example, Guillermos Isaza, an editor and publisher in
Colombia, was murdered in 1986.178 This crime remains
unsolved.9 If information surfaces that links the murder to a
government official, the press should be encouraged to publish
this. Exposing this type of behavior is critical to governmental
transparency.
The third part of the public figure definition 8 ° acknowledges
that a key aspect of democracy is the political process. The press
must have the ability to comment openly about this aspect of
democracy because an open and vigorous debate is essential and
pointing out questionable behavior of a candidate, worker, or
volunteer furthers this objective.
The last part of the public figure definition.8 addresses the
integrity of the public official. It may be relevant for the
populace to know whether a public official violated a law in the
past. For example, Colombian citizens have a right to know
whether a present government official was involved in the
murder of Guillermos Isaza even if the official's behavior
occurred prior to his or her governmental job."' The press should
have the discretion to decide which issues are relevant in this
area.
Taken as a whole, this public figure definition has several
advantages. It draws on treaties and the experiences of both the
U.S. and Europe." It recognizes a weakness of the U.S. doctrine
and seeks to avoid it." In addition, the definition does not
presume that the American Convention mandates only one
178. INTER AMERICAN PRESS ASSOCIATION, UNPUNISHED CRIMES AGAINST
JOURNALISTS 20 (1997).
179. Id.
180. Part three states: "a person who participates / participated in politics."
181. Part four states: 'a person who falls into either a, b, or c above and, in his or her
private capacity, violates or allegedly violates a law (whether found by a court to have
breached the law or not)."
182. See INTER AMERICAN PRESS ASSOCIATION, supra note 178, at 20, for further
information on the murder of Guillermos Isaza.
183. See discussion supra Parts I-III.
184. U.S. doctrine makes it easier for the press to mislead the American public,
thereby clouding transparency. See analysis of the Sullivan case supra Part III. In turn,
clouding transparency tends to discourage political debate and foster animosity. See Post-
Diana Press Vows to Behave, MIAMI HERALD, Sept. 26, 1997, at All.
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defamation doctrine for Article 13;5' rather, it acknowledges that
there could be several legitimate viewpoints concerning limits of
a free press."' Finally, this definition recognizes the bifurcation
between one's public and private life and acknowledges that a
person has some right to privacy.
In sum, this definition of public figure seeks to restrain
government efforts to curtail freedom of the press in areas having
a direct bearing on democratic stability but to allow government
efforts to rein in irresponsible press reporting in areas outside
the scope of this definition. Further, this definition constrains
the Inter-American Court, focusing it only on those matters that
are critical to the preservation of a democracy and democratic
institutions.
F. Step Four: Whether Substantiated Defamation
Has Occurred
After having determined that the alleged defamation relates
to a public figure, the Inter-American Court should begin the
final part of the analysis. The fourth step is an inquiry to
determine whether substantiated or unsubstantiated defamation
has occurred. The intent of the fourth step is to permit
publication of substantiated facts about a story even if publishing
those facts harms the reputation of a public official, except in
cases of national security. However, the press cannot alter those
facts or commingle its opinion among the facts such that a
distorted story is created which gives a false impression of the
public figure. The principal reason for this standard is that
truthful information alone is sufficient to call a public figure's
integrity into question without distortions from a journalist
because the public has the ability to recognize unscrupulous
behavior.
The fourth step distinguishes between two types of written
material for purposes of defamation: substantiated and
unsubstantiated.8 7 If a journalist publishes substantiated
185. There is no such mandate in the American Convention. American Convention,
supra note 8.
186. In absence of a clear mandate, it is reasonable to assume that there could be
more than one permissible interpretation of the American Convention.
187. This element is drawn from an analysis of four European Court cases. See
Prager and Oberschlick v. Austria, 21 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 1 (1995); Oberschlick v.
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information, no defamation occurs. 88  However, if a journalist
publishes unsubstantiated information, defamation has occurred.
For example, defamation occurs where a journalist publishes
opinion and presents it as truth and where a journalist
knowingly publishes false information."9
Substantiated information is information supported by
truthful evidence. 9 ' Consequently, as long as the substantiated
information is consistent with the definition of "public figure,"
the press should be able to publish the information regardless of
whether the information damages the reputation of the public
figure in question. This is not defamatory because the source of
the damage to the public figure's reputation derives from the
public figure's actions, not from the journalist's actions.
There are two types of unsubstantiated information:..
information presented as fact when it is actually the opinion of
the author; and information which is known to be false. The first
type of unsubstantiated material tends to be based on incomplete
information.9 The second type of unsubstantiated information is
that which is known to be false.
Creating a workable distinction between substantiated and
unsubstantiated information can provide the press the
opportunity to inform the public while protecting the press from
governmental interference. A workable distinction can also help
to maintain the integrity of political and governmental debate.
Moreover, maintaining transparency of government and
encouraging open discussion of politics places duties on both
public figures and the press. Surely the American Convention
was not designed to negate time-honored duties. To ignore the
press' duty to publish truthful information in favor of the press'
right to publish information hinders democratic stability.
Austria, 19 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 389 (1991); Barfod v. Denmark, 13 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A)
493 (1989); Lingens v. Austria, 8 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 407 (1986).
188. This concept is adapted from Prager and Oberschlick, 21 Eur. Ct. H.R. 1 and
Barfod, 13 Eur. Ct. H.R. 13.
189. These concepts are adapted from Lingens, 8 Eur. Ct. H.R. 407 and Oberschlick,
19 Eur. Ct. H. R. 389.
190. This concept is adapted from Prager and Oberschlick, 21 Eur. Ct. H.R. 1 and
Barfod, 13 Eur. Ct. H.R. 13.
191. The concept of unsubstantiated information is derived from the European
analysis of defamation. See Prager and Oberschlick, 21 Eur. Ct. H.R. 1 and Barfod, 13
Eur. Ct. H.R. 493.
192. See Prager and Oberschlick, 21 Eur. Ct. H.R. 1 and Barfod, 13 Eur. Ct. H.R. 493.
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G. Conclusion to Part VI
This Comment recommends that the Inter-American Court
defer to OAS member nations, allowing each nation to craft a
defamation doctrine suitable to its needs in all but the most
egregious cases. Step one recommends that the Inter-American
Court rule that desacato laws and laws which prohibit printing
substantiated information, except in cases of national security,
violate Article 13 of the Convention. Step two recommends that
the Inter-American Court accept the rulings of national courts
that are made on a good faith basis because reasonable
individuals can have varied and legitimate interpretations of free
press which concord with the American Convention. Steps three
and four recommend that member nations and the Inter-
American Court craft defamation doctrine in such a way as to
permit the press to publish substantiated information about
public figures, except in cases of national security, and prohibit
the printing of either information which the journalist knows to
be false or information based on opinion which is misrepresented
as factually true. The purpose of these recommendations is to
foster balanced public discourse, characterized by governmental
and political transparency and responsible press speech while
adhering to the principle that balanced public discourse places
duties on both public figures and the press.
VII. APPLYING THE FOUR-STEP APPROACH TO THE IBERO-
AMERICAN SUMMIT
At the Seventh Ibero-American Summit in November 1997,
Latin American leaders discussed the role of the press in their
developing democracies, particularly the way in which journalists
and editors report and convey information to the public.'93
Numerous Summit participants expressed their view that press
reporting presents a risk to their nascent democracies and should
be somewhat reined in.' Evidence of this view is reflected by
the control exercised over the press in a variety of ways in Latin
America, from more blatant forms of censorship to the more
193. Caldera Firm on Media Proposal, VENEZUELA ONLINE NEWS (visited Nov. 15,
1997) <http'/Ivzlanet.comlnews/polsat.htm#top>.
194. Declaracion de Margarita, supra note 127, para. 38-43.
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subtle, e.g. defamation suits.' 9' This animus culminated in
chapter six, entitled "The Right to Truthful Information," of the
Summit's declaration.'96 The purpose of chapter 6 and this aspect
of the Summit was to affirm the importance of the press in
nascent democracies and to discover ways in which countries can
encourage truthful press reporting while discouraging misleading
and untruthful reporting, which tends to undermine healthy
democratic debate.
97
This Comment's four-step approach can provide guidance to
the Inter-American Court (and OAS member nations) for
interpreting chapter six as well as declarations that attempt to
regulate expression. Chapter six contains two clauses designed
to encourage accurate press reporting.9 The first clause states
that people have the right to truthful information without
restriction or censorship.'99 This clause, because it separates
information into two categories, should be interpreted as
permitting substantiated information and prohibiting
unsubstantiated information. The second clause states that
journalists should be held to a standard of journalistic ethics and
social responsibility.2 "' This type of standard should be defined
using the constraints adopted by the proposed four-step
approach. A journalist has the responsibility to publish
substantiated information. It would appear incongruous with
ethical principles to permit someone to print material that he or
she knows or reasonably should know is inaccurate, assuming
the information could materially harm a public figure's
reputation.
At first glance, these clauses appear innocuous, but they
have been subject to harsh criticism by the press for their ability
to be misused.2"' Because there is strident disagreement over the
proper measure of restraint a government should exercise over
its media outlets, member nations should strive to clarify these
and similar clauses. As for the Inter-American Court, as long as
195. See generally IAPA REPORT, supra note 1, at 4-71.





201. Caldera Firm on Media Proposal, supra note 193; Michael Rowan, Finally,




its member nations have adopted clauses consistent with the first
step of the proposed four-step approach and have adhered to the
standard of good faith, their interpretations of the American
Convention, as represented by their rulings in defamation cases,
should be upheld.
VIII. CONCLUSION
As a result of the charged nature of the debate and the value
placed upon liberty, the free press issue never quite moves out of
the public eye. In fact, current examples of the free press debate
are readily available. One such example is the Ibero-American
Summit. In early November 1997, the Ibero-American Summit
in Venezuela marked the gathering of nearly all the principle
Latin American countries to discuss press reformation."2 The
Summit yielded a proposition that limits press freedom."' The
ultimate effect of the Summit is of course not yet known. A
second example of the current free press debate in Latin America
is the experience of the La Naci6n reporters. Only recently in
Costa Rica, the editor-in-chief and two reporters of La Naci6n
faced criminal charges for criticizing the government and a
former government official.
The time has come for the Inter-American Court to take a
defamation case to establish how the American Convention
should be read with regard to the defamation issue. The Inter-
American Court needs to establish a multi-step and objective
approach to analyze defamation so that it can prevent any issue
from perpetuating or establishing practices that violate the
American Convention. As proposed by this Comment, the steps
should be: an evaluation of the law in question; a good faith
determination; a defining of what constitutes a "public figure";
and a determination of whether substantiated or unsubstan-
tiated defamation has occurred.
The Inter-American Court, despite having some political
clout, 2 4 needs to be deferential, bearing in mind that it does not
have the legitimacy of the U.S. Supreme Court and that it is not
the Inter-American Court's function to invalidate differing,
though legitimate, interpretations of the American Convention.
202. Caldera Firm on Media Proposal, supra note 193.
203. Declaracion de Margarita, supra note 127, ch. 6.
204. Buergenthal, supra note 159.
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Rather, it is the Inter-American Court's function to prevent
egregious abuses of the American Convention."5 Free press is
immeasurably important but not absolute. The underlying
recommendations in this Comment and the multi-step approach
adopted herein take these factors and the cultural, political, and
socio-economic considerations that create these factors into
account in an attempt to create a viable system capable of
functioning now and evolving for the future.
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